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Since the 1960?, a welter of literature has been devoted 
to the topic of plea bargaining. Within a six year periodf for 
example, two natioral commissions have evaluated the efficacy of 
plea bargaining. Interestingly, both of these commissions came 
up with conclusions which were diametrically opposed. The 1967 
Presidents Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice1 concluded that plea bargaining is central to the effi­
cient operationoof the courts; whereas, the National Advisory
o
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in 1973 
called for the wholesale abolition of plea bargaining by 1978. 
This recent attention to the normative value of plea bargaining 
is surprising for two reasons: 1)because of its long history and 
2)its pervasiveness.
Plea bargaining is not a recent phenomenon in the criminal 
courts. In the Connecticut Superior Court, evidence for its 
widespread use has been charted back tot the 1880s.^ Prom 1880 
to 1910, the mean percentage of trials, represented 10 percent 
of the total dispositions; from 1910 to 1954, the percentage 
reached the 10 percent plateau only three tim^s. When Milton 
Heumann interviewed court personnel and private attorneys who had 
been active in the Connecticut Criminal courts since the 1930s,
1President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
of Justice. The Challenge of Crime in a free Society (Washington. 
D.C.i Uniter s * '.*..••gov.rgiii.hrjpglnfrag Wflo.’I 19&7), pp. 134-36,
National Advisory Commission on Crimiaal Justice Standards and 
Goals, Courts (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing 
Of fie, m i ; ,  pp. 44-49.
budlolal Depnrtamt, State of.Oonneotiout.
2he encountered cynicism over the current "clamor" about plea 
bargaining. These long time veterans maintained that arranging 
a deal with the state*s attorney for a plea of guilty has always
of these interviews between Milton Heumann and an Ortaville,
Connecticut prosecutor illustrates these veterans* surprise:
Prosecutors 1*11 tell ycm something about that, I 
mean everyone comes into this court and finds that,., 
plea bargaining is universal. It*s always been there, 
and these law school kidsf I mean, I am aghast some­
times when I meet some of the kids from the University 
of Connecticut Law Clinic,.,the phrase is new, but i • 
there was always plea bargaining.
Heumann: You mean you have always plea bargained?
Prosecutors Right, It has always been and lt*s had 
to be in the lower courts because we could never oper­
ate without it. I mean...well, I understand the 
problems of the defense lawyer which the brand new kiu 
hid today doesn*t understand. He had to earn a 
living, he had to get a result for his client, and 
sometimes the results were foolish...like a shop­
lifting charge changed to a breach of peace. But 
there** the same fine anyway. Then he could tell 
his client, **See, you*re not a thief, you just made 
a little pecadillo, and I did a great piece of work 
for you. That*s always the way of the lower courts . 
and always the way of the police court lawyer.
Plea bargaining has also not gone undetected by researchers. 
According to Peter F. Nardulii et al, crime survey researchers 
discovered its widespread use in the early twentieth century.^
A
been vital to the criminal law. The following excerpt of one
Narduls, Peter F.j Fleming, Roy B.j Eieenstein, Junes i
y ofose-
Invlalble Hands; and Criainal
J _________Li raw* paaeliverea tt tne iso. Annual meting of the Lew and Society Association in Boston, Massaohvaetts).
3The Supreme Court also did not directly address the issue of the
constitutionality of plea bargaining until the late 1960s. Prior
to this time, the Supreme Court only dealt with the issue, of plea
bargaining tangentially, stating that guilty pleas must be "uncoerced
and "voluntary.” There was ho attempt to apply these words to
the realities of everyday practice until 1968, in the case of
7
United States v. Jackson. This case dealt with the constitu­
tionality of the Federal Kidnapping Act. The Kidnapping Act 
stated that defendants who did not free their victims unharmed 
would be put to death, if the jury so chose. Defendant, Charles 
(Batman) Jackson, charged that because there was no death penalty 
clause pertaining to defendants who plead guilty, he suffered 
undo pressure to plead guilty in order that he would not risk 
his life. Both the trial court and Supreme Court agreed, dis­
missing his indictment.
Only two years later, the Supreme Court effectively reversed 
its decision of United States v. Jackson in Brady v. United States.
In Brady, the Court declared that the threat of execution,
(presented by the Kidnapping Act), did "not necessarily prove 
that the plea was coerced."8 This decision was reinforced by 
another decision in 1970, the case of parker v. North Carolina.9
U^nited States v. Jackson 390 U.S. 570 (1968),
8 Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
qP^arker v. North Carolina 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
4The defendant, a 15 year old boy, claimed that his plea of 
guilty to the charges of rape and burglary were involuntary, 
because he was pressured in pleading in order to avoid a possible 
death penalty. The Supreme Court denied his petition.
In North Carolina v. Alford, the defendant plead guilty 
to a first degree murder charge without admitting his guilt.1(^ 
This denial of guilt cast serious doubt on the voluntariness of 
his plea. Yet the Court proclaimed through Justice White, "An 
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly and 
understandingly consent to the imposition of the sentence, even 
if he is unable or unwilling to admit his participation in the 
acts constituting the crime#11 This decision is particularly 
controversial# Critics have expressed ooncern that the rehabili­
tative value of self-reproach, which presumably accompanies a 
defendant’s confession, will be spared.
In the case of Santpbello v. New York,11 the Supreme Court 
directly addressed the constitutionality of plea bargaining# In 
Santabello, the prosecution and defense agreed upon a deal. The 
defendant would plead guilty to a lesser charge and the prosecutor 
would refrain from offering a sentencing recommendation to the 
Court# Following this arrangement, delay ensued# Eventually 
a new defense and prosecution were assigned to the case. The new 
prosecutor did not uphold the previous agreement and recommended 
the maximumsentenoewmlioh the judge then imposed# The Supreme
iiiii ihiiii ■ i limn mi i in i a i ■ iiiii|«i#w#ww#iiiii#jM^j ipii
10North Carolina ▼, Alford 400 U.S. 257 (1971).
11Santoballo ▼. Haw York, 404 U.S, 257 (1971)*
’Ilk-/*, . ’VlM1 < -"
5Court unanimously reversed this decision, thereby officially 
acknowleging the legitimacy of plea bargain agreements*
Before proceeding to a discussion of the present pervasive­
ness of plea bargaining, it is important to define the term of 
plea bargaining* If a narrow definition is adopted, fewer 
courthouse practices would fit; whereas, a broad, flexible defi­
nition will undoubtedly Include a larger list of everyday 
practices* It is important to keep in mind that the goal is to 
define reality. If only^a very few cases fit the narrow, tight 
definition, it becomes an anachronism, only serving to distort 
reality* In fact, this is the precise problem with narrow
definitions of plea bargaining. A definition which includes
19
the two major types of plea bargaining, prosecutorial agreement 
with defense counsel to make a sentence recommendation to the 
judge and charge modification by prosecution^ is not complete.
Plea bargaining also occurs in many other forms. For example, 
often a judge participates in plea negotiations, communicating 
to the prosecuting attorney and defense attorney that a specific 
sentence would be given in exchange for a guilty plea. One 
exhaustive national survey of plea bargaining practices found 
that judicial participation in plea negotiations was characteristic 
of more than half of the 30 jurisdictions studied.1** Although
12Jd. at 33.
Miller, Herbert McDonald, William F.; Cramer, James A.;(Washington, D.C.i U.S. xx ix#
6
those judges who participated usually constitued only a minority 
in each jurisdiction, according to Filler et al, ”In some instances, 
this minority accounts for a disproportionate share of the disposi- 
tions of the c o u r t r o o m , N o t  only does excluding one of these 
three very common types of plea > *>rgaining distort reality, but 
envisioning them as singular activities also does. Often these 
activities may operate in tandem as well as singularly. Unfor­
tunately, it is difficult to predict within one courthouse what 
the usual paractice will be, much less attempting to predict 
crossnationally. This difficulty is largely due to the lack of 
supervision given to the individual prosecutor who is at the head 
of the decision-making process, deciding on whether to prosecute, 
nolle, or bargain a case. Just as there are dangers in positing 
too narrow a definition for plea bargaining, so there are also 
dangers in positing too bread-a definition. This, according to 
Nardulli et al, has been a more frequent problem in the literal 
tures "The term ’plea bargaining’ has been used to encompass so
many divergent forms of interaction that it has become an impedi­
ng
ment to understanding how criminal courts really operate.” The
problem seems to be largely in many authors’ carelessness with
specificity. When studies are made which report two-thirds of
cases in such-and-such jurisdiction plea bargained, researchers
do not usually go one step further and expound upon what type of
plea bargain they are referring to. Without this specificity, no
Hid. at 36.
at xiv,
Nardulli at al, op, cit., p. 1,
7one knows exactly what form the ambiguous words 11 plea bargaining”
take in reality. In addition, those who promulgate that reform
is badly needed, for instance, judicial participation in plea
discussions or defendant participation, will not ever know where
to begin such reforms or whether it is normal practice in many
jurisdictions already. Plea bargaining, according to Donald
17
Newman, can be either explicit of implicit. Explicit plea
bargaining refers to outright deals which are voiced and agreed
upon. Implicit bargaining refers to knowlege a defendant has
acquired in one way or another, which is persuading him tv her '
to plead guilty. Usually, this is knowlege that he or she will
suffer a more severe penalty, if he or she goes to trial. How
plea bargaining has been stretched to this limit, is difficult
to imagine. Without getting into a winded discussion of the
definition of ’bargain” also, this brief definition in Webster’s
Dictionary should suffice; "An agreement between parties settling
what each gives or receives in a transaction between them or
what course of action or policy each pursues in respect to the 
ip
other.” This definition clearly elucidates that the word 
"bargain” connotes an interaction, ie. the word "parties”. 
Further, there is also mention of an "agreement” in which both 
parties gives, receives or decides upon pursuing a certain route.
17
Newman, D,J., Convictions The Determination of Guilt or 
Innocence Without trial, TOfetei. p. f c O . 1 . .
1AWebster's l'hird New Unabridged International Dictionary. (G 
& C tferriam Company'id., Clo?e, Philip ffaB'cbcic,"19M), p/*76.
QImplicit pit;a bargaining does not involve any of the well-esta- 
bilished'going rates 'of a bargain,1^  All it imports is that a 
defendant, for one reason or another, decides it is advantageous 
not to plead guilty. No one has agreed upon anything. There 
is not more than one party involved in settling or agreeing upon 
anything. Instead, it is a singular, conscious act performed by 
the defendant him or herself, Even if the defendant has been 
warned of the probability of a harsher sentence that will result 
if he goes to trial, he has not bargained for anything— even 
though his decision was influenced by another party.
Thus, plea bargaining is an explicit act in which an agree­
ment is made between at least two parties that each shall carry 
out a certain activity. Now that the tedious task of defining 
plea bargaining is complete, it is possible to move on to a 
discussion of the present pervasiveness of plea bargaining. At
present, one of the most comprehensive studies available was
20
produced by Miller et al. Although this study subscribes to 
the implicit as well as the explicit model of plea bargaining, 
there was little evidence of ’implicit’* bargaining in 27 of the 1920
19
Nardulli, et al, op, cit* at 8. His discussion of the "consen­
sus model” points out that plea bargaining often resembles a 
"supermarket" more than a "bazaar." p*7* In other words, there 
are often going rates which are understood within the particular 
jurisdiction* He writes, "Going rates are a county specific 
range of acceptable sentences for a given offense* While they 
vary across counties, they bind the plea discussions in a given 
county and import predictability to sentencing that renders the 
machinations implicit in the concessions model unnecessary, even 
futile, at least for most cases*" p. 8 *
20Miller et al, op. cit. 13.
q30 jurisdictions studied."*1 Instead, explicit bargaining was the
norm in the 27 jurisdictions studied. According to the President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 90
percent of all persons convicted of a crime are convicted by
their plea of guilty." Unless rewards were being offered for
defendants to waive their right to trial, it is highly doubtful
thatj (explicit or implicit), such a high percentage of defendants
would freely give up the right to proclaim their innocence.Advantages of plea Bargaining
With plea bargaining such a pervasive phenomenon, the advan­
tages and disadvantages of its use have a profound effect on the 
criminal justice system# Plea bargaining is very controversial 
and thus a great amount of literature has been devoted to enumer­
ating the many assets and liabilities of its practice# Among the 
assets are the psychological benefits extracted by the defendant 
as a result of his entering a guilty plea. A defendant, by admitting 
his guilt, must face the reality of his actions more completely.
As a result, he will suffer self-reproach or reproach from the 
moral authorities to whom he confesses. ' This serves as a punish­
ment in and of itself. Therefore, claim proponents of this arrange­
ment, a lighter sentence is justified. Also, there are often
2lMiller et al, op. cit. l?t P* 2?* See footnote J2 for a Hat of the 
jurisdictions included in this study.
22President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government’ Prlntlnfe 0f7R ‘s, "1VS7J J
2^ Fugel, Man, Morals & Society 148 (1945).
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psychological benefits resulting from plea bargaining for the 
24victim, Kor instance, in rape and indecent liberties cases
ii could be psychologically devastating for the victim to undergo
a public trial, where he or she would have to appear in court
and recount the details of the crime against him or her. In other
cases, the publicity which occurs with a public trial can be
what is dangerous to the victim.
There is also a kind of psychological benefit extracted by
the defense and prosecuting attorney in plea bargaining proceedings,
Hossett and Cressey write, "In psychological terms, the exercise
of punitive authority, with its attendant aggression, domination
and destructiveness, generates guilt and anxiety in the official.
The official gets the greatest relief from this anxiety from the
acceptance of the punishing set by its v i c t i m s P l e a  bargaining
reduces the attorney's guilt, because he knows that the defendant
has accepted the punishment. Plea bargaining also serves co help 
SBroaecuting
the^attorney's morale by ensuring that he or she does not have to 
be attached with the stigma of having "lost" a case,26
Hossett and Cressey argue that plea bargaining is necessary 
because, "The very universality of the Itgal rules demand discre­
tionary opportunities for interpretations and exceptions,"27 According
24
American Bar Assoc., "Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty", 
1.8 at 47-48, (Tentative Draft, 1967).
29Rossett and Cressey, Justice By Consent. (Philadelphiai J. B. 
Lippencott Company, 1976J, p# 146
26id.
27Id. at 54.
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to Hossett and Cressey, discretion is necessary because there is
”a fundamental need for flexibility--for procedures which are fair
28
because they avoid formal rules*’1 Each armed robbery and rape 
case is unique to the circumstances and individuals involved.
If there is no room made for discretion in these cases, punishment 
may be unnecessarily harsh and ineffective. Unfortunately, the 
unnecessary harshness of the criminal law often functions only 
to generate animosity among defendants. They react in turn by 
rejecting the values of the criminal law, perceiving it as an 
enemy of the society which established it.2^
Many "defenders” of plea bargaining classify it as a necessary 
evil which exists in order to ease case overload. However,
evidence compiled by Abraham Blumberg shows that the real reason 
plea bargaining exists is due to defence attorneys' decision that 
discretion is needed. Evidence for this is found in the much larger 
percentage of defense attorneys, as opposed to prosecuting attorneys 
and judges, which suggest to the defendant to plead guilty. Blumberg 
found that fully 57 percent of defendants had been advised by 
defense attorneys, whereas prosecuting attorneys constituted a mere 16 
percent.^  (Other, suggesting a guilty plea included psychiatrists 
wives, other relatives, friends, etc.) These statistics are signifi­
cant, because one would expect prosecuting attorneys to suggest
28id. at 170.
29J$. at 67.
,0BlvjBberg, Abraham, "The Practice of Law as Confidence (Jaeei 
Opepljgttjtanal Co-optloa of a Professor," 1 Law and Society Rev.
a plea of guilty to defendants in much higher proportion to defense 
attorneys. Prosecuting attorneys and judges would be the court 
actors feelings the most administrative pressure. Defense attor­
neys, on the other hand, would be affected more by pressure to
IP
help their clients in the most beneficial way possible. Further 
evidence that plea bargaining exists for reasons beyond its ability 
to ease case overload, is presented in a study by the National 
Institute of Law Enforcement and Justice. In this study, sub­
stantial differences in guilty plea rates was found between
jurisdictions, despite the size ot the population involved.
Some jurisdictions tried 100-300 psroent mors cases than 'other
jurisdictions with smaller populations.^1 As Miller et al Suggest, 
f,We must ask whether these fluctuations may be accounted for by 
factors other than administrative necessity and case backlog."^ 
Milton Neumann also disagrees with the argument that plea bargain­
ing is a by-product of high case pressure. Neumann studied state 
superior courts throughout the United States and found the trial 
rates to vary minimally for low and high volume courts. In the 
Connecticut Superior Court, the rates did not differ after September 
1971, despite the decrease in its jurisdiction wh ich occured at 
this time. (The Connecticut clrSuit courts* jurisdiction w«*s
5lKiller et al op. cit. p.23.
32Id.
33J£. at 29. Sable*'5 76.
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increased to include cases punishable by up to five years
\34imprisonment, instead of just one year.)
Although plea bargaining is praised for performing an
important discretionary purpose, this does not imply that it is
an arbitrary system. Peter *F. Nardulli found more evidence for
a "consensus’1 model of plea bargaining, rather than a "concessions"
35
model. The "concessions" model posits that plea bargaining is 
ad hoc and arbitrary. According to this model, factors such as 
the friendship between a prosecutor and defense attorney can 
influence the outcome of a case. The "consensus" model, on the 
other hand, postulates that plea bargaining is not ad hoc. Instead, 
plea bargaining is purportedly controlled by the existence of "strong, 
well-established 'going rates'.“ While they vary across counties, 
they bind the plea discussions in a given county and import predic­
tability to sentencing that renders the machinations implicit in 
the concessions model unnecessary, even futile, at least for most 
c a s e s . N a r d u l l i  found strong evidence for ’going rates". In 
a broad based study of criminal courts in nine counties in Illinois, 
Michigan, and Pennsylvania, it was found in over 82 percent of cases 
where defendants plead guilty that a "going rate" applied, "Going rates"
fell into three categories. fhiehicategory a defendant fell into 
was influenced greatly by the defendant's criminal record.
„ 34M* at 30-31. See Table 7, p. 31.
^Nardulli .t al op. clt. IU ,
36J|,et 8.
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It was found, however, that "going rates" have little
impact on trials. For example, "First offenders who went to
trial were much less apt to get probation,than those who plead 
xn
g u i l t y . T h e r e f o r e ,  according to the results of this study, 
plea bargaining plays an important discretionary role in the 
dispositional process, which is infrequently played at trial.
far from arbitrary, there seem to be set criteria within 
the criminal courts which govern the results of the plea bargain­
ing process. For example, while some charge reductions were 
found in approximately 35 percent of guilty plea cases, there 
was found to be "complete consistency" in 60 percent of these cases. 
w  The Agoing rates" that develop within criminal courts are unique 
to each jurisdiction. Koseeit and Cressey explain, "Day bv day, 
judges, prosecutors, defendants, and probation officers encounter 
the same basic types of cases. Each brings to his work a blend 
of the conflicting ideas of justice held by important groups in 
the larger community. In time, courthouse workers develop a
XQ
group sense of justice."^ Plea bargaining thus serves as a 
vehicle for the use of discretion, which not only fits the punish­
ment to the unique individual involved, but also to the unique 
commfcnity norms involved.
The use of discretion in plea bargaining is aided by the 
availability of evidence which is often excluded at trial. The
57Id. at 36.
*®Ro.».tt and Cr....y op. ait. p. 85.
growth of the jury system has brought about rules which are
responsible for keeping out evidence at trial which is often
very'important. Gleisser writes, ”The effect of this is to
block the road to a better finding of facts.” According to
Gleisser, the reason for these rules has been the growing
realization that jurors are highly incapable o£ separating
important information relating to the issue at hand from
•jjo
meaningless data.” That this is important is evident, be­
cause of the fact that judges will want to hear the samd infor­
mation that would be excluded in a jury trial. Gleisser writes 
that it is ”quite common” in a trial before a jury to have a 
witness begin to say, ”When I saw the accident, my sister-in- 
law turned to me and said she thought the driver had been 
drinking by the way he...Suddenly a heavy objection is heard 
from a lawyer and sustained by the judge. When exactly the 
same incident takes place in a trial before a judge alone, the 
same objection is raised at the same point. But the judge hare 
will probably say; *The evidence will be received for whatever 
value it toay have.fH^
Jerome Frank writes, ”lt is not strange that frequently 
truthful witnesses are...misunderstood, that they nervously react 
in such a way as to create the impression that they are cither *40
^Gleisser, Marcus, Juries and Justice» (South Brunswick & New 
York; A.S. Barnes, Londont fnomas Yoseloff and Company Ltd., 
19#8) p. 111.
40Id. at 113.
Hr.. ■
* * - .
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evading or intentionally falsifytng.1 At trial, the defendants, 
victims, and witnesses, are subject to an extraordinary amount of 
pressure. For most participants, the trial represents a foreign 
medium for fact finding. A defendant's body language and ability 
to deal w Mi  pressure, may play an unnecessarily strong role in 
their presentation of testimony. In the end, it may be the indi­
vidual who has the best speech and acting skills that appears the 
most truthful. The individual who is nervous may appear as though 
he or she is trying to hide something.
An example of the effect a defendant's speech skills can 
play on the minds of jurors is given by a Dade City, Florida 
public defender. He relates the story of a robbery ease, In 
which the defendant had a strong defense which required "articulate 
testimony" and the "ability to remain cool under cross-examination." 
Although the prosecution had an eye witness who gave positive 
identification of the defendant! there was no other convincing 
evidence that they brought forth. According to this public 
defender* tuo young defendant Wae convicted because he was not 
articulate and able to perform coolly under croee-eiamination. 
he found this t.t%* Won, where a factually innocent defendant is 
convict..* ooemon,**
ittam.yi, upon tik* sivsnUf. of wit-
»*•••• MU lefewUnts* vttl*er*.illty. Jeros* Freak Wit..* "file 
lawyer .cnitl.r. it ki. .sty H  create a false impresilon if he can,
** «•*•*■• W*Mw» Who iiv.8 teitisony, If th. wit«*i*
tMf|§
m .  e .  it. fi.
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who g iven testimony 
fr ihtoned by the u n f m  i 1 l-ritv 
in bio cro3s-cxam i nut ion, pi a’; u
the wi tness and make i t  arpear
. A 7 tacts.
1 -opens to be timid, 
nf the courf room wavs, the lawyer, 
on the weakness, in order to confuse 
that he is conceal ing significant
Manuals writter to educate lawyers about effective techniques 
to use when cross-examining witnesses, detail how to take advantage 
of the demeanor of witnesses and defendants in order to make them 
appmar lees trustworthy. Longenecker writes of such techniques 
in Hints on. the Trial of a Lawsuit, lie educates the lawyer on the 
effectiveness of a "rapid cro33-oxaminat i onM i i ruining the testimony 
of a !ftruthful, honest, over-eauticus witness#44 Wigmore writes 
of how an intimidating manner in posing questions can be an 
effective way to discredit o witness’s testimony# He * xpi a ins 
that this may so coerce or discomfort the witness that his or her 
answers do not represent his actual knowlepe on the subject. In 
addition, he writes, "Questions which in form or subject cause 
embarassment, shame or anger in the -itnesa or defendant may unfairly 
lead him cr her to such demeanor or utterance that the impression 
produced by his or her statements does not do justice to its real 
testimonial value#4**
Besides avoiding* the above problems associated with trial by 
jury, plea bargaining most importantly keeps those defendants out 
of court who.do nit have a case to go to trial with. In fact,
4*frank, Jerome, op. cit. at 41# p. 460.
Longenecker, Holla Rudolph. Hints on the 
(Chicago: Callaghan,and Wm
44
45frankf Jerome, op, ott# at 41# p#
aec-r'i ing to Herbevi Jacob, ”In ordinary eases, the process 
(^ adrU ui c tr : t.i or of just ice^  does not seek to establish guilt, for 
guile la admitted.”^  Ac cord in.- to Neumann, ’Approximately 90 
perc’ nt of defendants in the court are factual 1 y guilty, uf these, 
a significant percentage have no substantia1 grounds to contest 
lno state’s case; that is, they are factually and legally guilty, 
ar.A their trials would he barren of any contentions 1 ikelv to pro­
duce an acquit tal.
he use of trial By jury alsn causes undue delay in the courthouse
c of ouch procedures as t h e pe rempt ory c ha 11 e nge d rag s the trial
ccording to Broeder, thel be!neUts of voir dire are negligible*
empirical study % r t v\ i u . ' * . v* r i. r lire examination, he found that,
”Voir dire w >r grossly ineffective, not only tr weeding out *unfavorabl
jurors, but even in eliciting the data which would have shown
AO
particular jurors as verly likely to prove unfavorable. According
to Breeder, about >10 percent of the lawyer’s voir dire time is spent 
’indoctrinating”, whereas only ?0 percent was 3pent in ’sifting out 
the favorable from the unfavorable veniremen. He further emphasizes 
that despite the lawyers’ efforts to the contrary, ”indoctrination'
did not often appear to succeed.” Zeisel and Diamond report similar
findings in the Note, ’The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury
49
and Verdict.” Albert Alshuler concludes that, ’The available *49
A
Jacob, Herbert, Justice in America. (Boston. Toronto! utt.li>. 
Brown and Company p7 l'M.---  ,
^Heumann. Milton op. cit, 4, p. 156.
JO *.
Broader, 'Voir Dire Examination: A.n Empirical Study,11 5P S.
California L. Rev. 503, 505. (1965).
49^Zeisel and Diamond, ’The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury 
Verdict”, 30 Stanford Law Review 514.-5 18,
our extended sc?lectio?!ev idence s t r o n g 'y  ouggests th a t ,  a f te r
proceed.ingn are conclu-.:e t, a 1 ?rwv’cr's at ir j< l r cr onlv Mi or bier
cl lent' a t a c t; c a 1 ad van j3 al most as n !. k <r> 1y tr guess Incorreet1
as to vueso corrc*> t V 1y 'h • p 1a ing which ;:rnn]re0 t i V (: ' *; v' .o r-r> to
cha11enge."" '
other 1Reason.r f or Lini n nCOG3 '*rv Lei'fVs Of Trials
t h<:vsc ar*‘" net■ the ionly detay3 0 dofcT.dcr:t is in store for if
he or 31re decides to go to tr la1 . v/’ 6:the r hi s or her cose is heard
10 fore '; ‘urv : r ud:g'# tt" d< a; i V* \3 h f~s j" Cl ,'1 iis 11kely to endure cai
be stag:;ering. baMv ’J-e ru> r;f offern ivo 1etw J whot onward J omes
labels, *»dil atorv 1awyei
r 1
* *  C {  H 
• e lie found erimi rual lawyers across the
country admitt ir:g t; h a t :h (■ v i •1.av LjOt i tv'p hopes that- o v/ j t. V f; 1”
il ! forget r change th-.--:^ t'Stiruny. this nitnation creates an
UTl ! nlvantago t *«3nr.ed criminal. Leonard Downie writes:
Certain defer.Lints, usually the often convicted 
ana knawlogeahle, win freedom simpjy by outwaiting 
tV.o courts. Patiently, they endure delay after 
del ay arising 03 a natural product of the over­
loaded system, ami then they have their lawyer 
stall still longer with procedural tricks and 
requests for postponements that nobody has time 
to challenge* In the end, witnesses who have 
come bafek to court again and again, stop showing 
up, or, an the months pass, even the most conscien­
tious am ng them find their memories fading*
Judges and prosecutors become impatient with musty 
cases that further bog down thitt operation, and 
a careful L” timed request by the defense lawyer, 
often on a day when witnesses are not present, 
is egaugh to persuade a judge to throw the caner> i y *4*V J V «
3(dl3huler, Albert, "Alternatives to Plea Bargaining," 36 U. of
Chicago L. Rev. 1000 (1983).
n d
James, Howard, Crisis in the Courts. (New York: McKay Publishing
Co., 1971), p. 27.' , s
townie, Leonard, -Tustlce Denied. (New York: Prager Publishing
Co,, 1971), p. 31*
cr
t Vl : l \ C' J
. Of t hreoe tec hr i hk f -, <• * d *'1 MA. * - *; vg trial are esp<eoj v! jy
■j sma’1 pore -tap- n f* *llf: \J r* 'r, ■* eft ' iwvcr:' f •*; v.iil e
*• H  I- •; *0 James, crit of th e the usands of
, ' V,and- the h>0 k a u t < i .v* UK - 1 cc.c ••
P V, ; ’ n * • j; ? 1 > r * V': } Vje tve or 7f t K  cane*s ;■<ffd Inc
c : t, ’ ■ r Jl—voiced, h round th at ft 1aw\ rs at of
tried a twit C,^ p».r» 00, y \t - f :r 1 the cases. Acc: ->ri)
t  o i f i v e  month 3 urv t v o f  - or . t  i . n u a n c e s  i r  P h i l a d e l p h i a ,  JO p e r c e n t
h 4recurred because t.hu 0 f-'-npc attorney wan unava il ahl e,
who uc o of ” -Xpert w itne 3300" ol rr.’ fro juentl y cousin delay,  ^
'.here witnesses, such as doc tors, 'o d psychiatrists, are ~fter 
hard to pet to <yjurt W  cncue of the ir r-wn busy schedules. V/he*- 
these witnesses finalIv ic appear at trial, their testimony ir 
often long winded and technical. According to James, it is 
often used to confuse jurors, rather than help them make
h 0
know i cpe'-hl e decisions,' Process costs are another cause nf dr - ivs. 
According tc Downie, "Time and motion are wasted, and serious
errors risked at every stage of civil and criminal cases by 
outmoded and unnecessary formalities, paper work, and special 
privileges for judges, lawyers, and courthouse personnel...works 
and decisions in the courthouse are delievered on foot, as they have lor
c 7
James, Howard, op. cit. 51, p. 27.
SJ
^Rugabar, Walter, "Just ice is Slow and Unsure in Nation’s Busy 
Courts", (January 6, 19~1, New York Times)
"5Id. at 30.
%  Janes, Howard, op. cit. 5 1, p. 30. '
21
r n? i Albert A1shuler believes these costs pressure
58
untold years.
a defendant into pleading guil ty in misdemc.. nor cases 
reasons, the defendant finds the misdemeanor com’ lotion less 
debilitating than going to trial* Typically, a guilty plea to 
a misdemeanor offense results only in a suppendec sentence, 
followed by a small fine. If the defendant goes to jail, be 
will have to miss out on at least one day of work. Often, due 
to continuances, lie misses many more days of work,
With more and more cases being filed each year, the delays 
mount and tr.l-.-i by jury becomes increasingly time consuming, ir. 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, for example, the number of criminal canes 
filed in Hennepin City increased 50 percent between 1965 and 1906," 
The statewide average increased 46 percent'during this time, in 
Cleveland, which reportedly has one of the worst big city criminal 
backlogs in the notion, Donald F. Lybarger, Chief Justice, reported 
1409 criminal cases pending as of March 27, 1967. Those in jail
go
sometimes wait eight to ten months to gc. to trial, and defendants
An
out on jail may wait even longer. According to James, the number 
of defendants asking for criminal trials has gone up 300 percent 
in the last five years, and arrests have gone up 30 percent.^1 *5
^Downie, Leonard, Jr., op. cit, 52. p#. 139.
5fiAlshuler, Albert, op. cit, 50, p. 953,
59James, Howard,
60Id.
at 22.
op. cit. 51* p# 23.
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Problems with Juries
The problem of delays is not the only problem a defendant 
must face if he or she decides to go to trial, rather than plea 
bargain. In this section, problems specific to the jury and the 
jury trial itself will be discussed.
The jury is often too independent of the law. According to
Jerome Prank, instead of following the instructions of the court,
”The jury determines that they don’t want ’pretty Nellie brown*
to go to jail for killing her husband, and they bring in the
general verdict aco r ingly. Ordinarily, to all practical
intents and purposes, the judge's views of the law might never
have been expressed. Parry falcon and Mans Meisel chronicle
specific types of cases where the jury tends to be unusually
lenient fir harsh in an exhaustive study of jury b e h a v i o r . T h e y
found the jury to be most lenient in drunken driving cases.
They write, ’Prosecution for this crime, with its overtones of an*£ *7
antiliquor policy is unpopular.” ? The jury apparently is also 
very moved by the mandatory loss of a driver's license for this 
type of offense. As one judge they interviewed commented, ’Juries 
generally feel punishment (loss of license for one year) is too 
severe and are reluctant to convict except in aggravated cases. 
According to Kalven and Zeisel, the jury will often return a
verdict of not guilty in situations such as this, even if they 
feel the defendant is guilty as charged.^
62Quincey, Richard, ed.. Crime and Justice in Sooiaty. Frank. Jerome. "The Myth of the jGry"? (BbaW 1,0*157 BrW,~ n> Co., W9), W*
Kalven, Harry, Jr. and Zeisel, Hans, (Boston & Toronto: Little,
®nd Co#* 1966'# pp. 534#
** 3jQ8~3Q9.
6 3
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Jurors are also lenient with individuals they find "attractive."
These include the elderly, young, and handicapped. Women who are 
widowed, mothers, attractive or emotional on the witness stand arc 
given more sympathetic treatment. Kalven and Zeisel wtite, "At
times the defendant might be well advised to let his wife cry for
65
him." They quote one judge they interviewed who noted one 
particular case in which a jury of all women, with the exception of 
one mail, were very sympathetic to the defendants wife. The woman 
was "lovely" and impressed the juiv. When she took the stand, she 
cried and four of the jurors cried with her. Not surprisingly, the 
defendant was acquitted,
Kalven and Zeisel found the highest degree of sympathy granted 
to young defendants, next women defendants, followed by older 
defendants. Negro defendants, however, were found to be disadvantaged.
The fact that a defendant,, merely because of the color of his or 
her skin, is unfairly biased against smacks of injustice. The article,
"The Racial Factor in Prison Sentences" writes, Being black* gener­
ally means one kind of sentence, while 'being white' generally means 
a n o t h e r . A c c o r d i n g  to this article, whites are more likely to be 
committed for a type of offense which requires a long prison sentence 
than Negros. 3 In this study, it was found that 60 percent of whites 
charges with murder were convicted, whereas only 39 percent of Negros 
charges with murder were eventually convicted. On the other hand, offenses
K^alven, Harry Jr. and Zeisel, Hans, op. cit. 63, p. 204.
6^ Quincey, Richard, ed., op. oit. 62, "The Racial Factor in Prison .Sentenoes", p. 425.
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which require shorter sentences, such as burglary, the opposite 
was found to he true. The article , "The Racial Factor in Prison
Sentences” found that 47.5 percent of Negro defendants charges with 
burglary were convicted, whereas only “55 percent of white defendants
charged with burglary were convicted. This discrepancy exists for 
racial reasons. The typical jury, in which the majority of jurors 
are white, is not as concerned about Negros committing burglary, 
because murder is an intra-racial crime. The article, ”The Racial 
Fator in Prison Sentences” explains, ”Iocal norms tolerate a less 
rigorous enforcement of the law; the disorder is mainly located 
within the Negro society. On the other hand, burglary is an inter­
racial offense. When a Negro is an offender, his or her attack is 
usually against the property of a white person* Local norms are less 
tolerant, for the motivation to protect a 'Negro1 society.”^  Kalven 
and Zeisel found the jury responded in the same way to Indians as 
to Negros, They offer a further explanation for the juries1 len­
iency in minority inter-racial crimes. They write, ”The j y is,,, 
moved at times to leniency, because it views the defendant as not 
fully acculterated and incapable of white standards of self-control*”'0 
Juries are also known to be biased and caprlseious in cases 
which hit a weak spot in one or more of the jurors. The Miller 6970
69|d. at 428.
70Kalven, Harry Jr. ana Zaisel, Hans, op. cit, 63, p. 340.
et al study of plea bargaining cites an example which an ’experi- 
enced" public defender from Dado Cityf Florida relays. The case 
involved a young black man charged with robbery. Despite a strong 
defense, the defendant wo? convicted. The public defender subse­
quently learned that cm: juror was a store owner who had been robbed 
several times and felt that someone should be "made to suffer for 
these robberies*’. Pc reported ’ ; had played a major role in 
influencing the other jurors to enter a guilty verdict.
As this case suggests, juries ire often unpredictable* Each 
jury may have weaknesses for certain topics which can affect the 
eventual outcome, Howard James writes, 11 Men accused of serious 
crimes have been convicted on little evidence, or set free in air­
tight cases after the id men and women finished their deliberations.w 
Juries are further unpredictable because of their tendency to net 
let previous convictions influence the length of sentence thev
7'*
impose. This practice is particularly capriiscious for first
offenders. They may -Mtbcr a!? r*'» ” c'chr •* sentence than they 
deserve or he faced with the same sentence that a repeat offender 
receives.
Jerome Frank also writes of juries lack of predictability.
He writes, ’Jury trials satisfy the childish longing for certainty, 
finality and predictability. In practice, however, this longing 
is hopelessly t h warted..The decisions of many cases are products 
of irresponsible jury caprice and prejudice. That the defendant is
^1Miller, et al, op# cit. 13, p# 96. For a further discussion of this 
case, see p* 16 of this thesis.
^Jamea, Howard, op, cit. 51* P# 203.
Fa|tor Prison Sentences?, Quinotf, Richard, ed.,
a wealthy corporation and the plaintiff is a poor boy; that
the principle witness for one of the parties is c Mason or
Catholic; "hat the att rrnv for the accused is a brilliant
orator— sue* facts often determine who will win or V se.u74 
Juries are known to b< part ■ eularlv rough on cases involving
sex ami children, according to the University of Chicago study.7^
Vet, they tend to look the other way In rape cases involving
girls near the ago of consent if violence is not involved.
According to the University of Chicago studv, MLik® each judge,
each jury is different, from time to time, jurors surprise
everyone. Since jurors meet in secret, no one really knows
how they hammer our a decision#*76 When the University of
Chicago researchers tried to find cut what goes on during
*jury tipping”, they erected a national uproar, according to 
77Howard James.
One reason juries are so, unpredictable, is due to the heavy 
influence one jurortcan have over others, earlier, a case was 
cited in which a juror felt 0wrongly about a robber” case, 
because he had been robbed, and was at e to influence the other
70
jurors to bring in i ruling against the defendant. Marcus
74]?rai'k, Jerome, 0p, cit. 62, p. 251.
75 Chicago study# Mcerpt from Jastt9f Howard, op«cit, 51f 202.
76M -
77Jd. at 203.
"^ Miller, et al, op. cit, 13, 71, p. 96.
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Glelaser explains:
rruetieally any 3rouP divides itself into a 
leader^ano foil ewers; one person dominates
llu *u**ers t>v' m°st persuasive argument, 
whether o r. wh \ eh restaurant to go to after 
the theater--r;r what verd ict should be re­
turned* Uiers in t'r.e group may offer token 
suggestions on attempt to show a font of 
independence has been made; however, once 
they nave ci nethis, they arc ready to follow 
the leader and agree with his verdict• ••.Thus 
it can be soon that quite often what is 
described as a joint verdict of all twelve 
minds on the panel is in reality the decision 
of one strong mind and the passive acceptance 7G 
by those who sre weaker and easy to influence. '
Because each leader j.3 unique in bis or her thoughts rod 
ideas, juries can be extremely unpredictable, A study by the 
University of lexas* Hadlo and Television Department proved how 
unpredictable juries can he?^ The study was conducted in 196b. A 
90 minute movie about a real-life murder, using real-life performers 
(except the defendant), was shown to a live audience. The verdicts 
they came up with were often strikingly different. Based on the 
same evidence, the rnock jurists1 verdicts ranged from acquittal 
to the death penalty.
Unfortunately, it is not possible in every jury trial to 
ascertain the opinions of the jury members. In interviews with 
jurors, Albert Alshuler found many admitting that they had based 
their verdict on improper evidence* he even found cases where juries 
returned verdicts other than their own# In one case, they ended 
up convicting a defendant whom they had meant to acquit. When the
^Gleisser, Marcus, dp# olt# 39, p. 22Q#" *»•' ■*"' * ‘V * ,
80Id. at 137, University of Texas* Radi# and Television Dept., 1965, 
81Al#ha£ir, Albert, op, eit. 50, p. i001,
. -  \ , •  ’
?n
ease was brought be fere the appellate court in Sellars v. U.S.^1 
the judge did not bud3c from the rule flat jurors may not impeach 
their own verdict, 'this war despite the fact that nine out of 
the twelve jurors tee t i fled that they had accepted the defendants 
claim of scIf-de fenso in the ease and had meant to acquit.
The lawyer Walter J. bidder, a frequent contributor to the 
dew Jersey journal, he!ieves that jur^rs do n^t base their 
opinions on the facte of the case and the instructions of the 
court. Instead, he believes that the minds of the jurors are 
’notoriously susceptible co influences which are extraneous to 
the merits of the controversy, and,,,the jury's verdict is likely 
to be determined by considerations which are irrelevant to a just
pp
determination of the case.""
One "extraneous” influence juries are susceptible to is 
lawyer dramatics. According to CJleisser, "Juries are eoitive 
audiences for a real-life form of dramatics. Conditioned as they 
are by soap operas ana movies, they react to such things much 
mure than would the scientific mind of the trained analyst."
Jt 'ome Frank writes that "The lawyer uses every trick of oratory 
and acting to appeal to the crudest emotions of the twelve good 
me:, and women of the jur/. He knows only too well that they will 
not nicely weigh the testimony, nor riscrimlnately consicer
Q ‘St
what the judge has told them of the law." According to Gleisser, 812
81Sellars va. U.S. 401 A. 2d 974 '(D.C. ->979)
82
James, Howard, op. cit. 51# p# 196.
Q-l
-Trailk, J.rome, op. cit. 62, p,
-O
"..t's r.;-t rare +o have a 1 awver's voief* break with sobs in 1 
or her final summation to the jury and it jg quite normal to
see him or her pound the jury rail as he drives home a poin* 
frank also found with bidder that the jury determine:), 1
the facts, but the lege] rights and obligations of the partie,
t h e  s u i t , , '  : 'nt ’ a r t  u r a t e '  1 ’/  , ! * \ g o * ■-  ^>.. v i s i o n s  o r e mono hv n o r s o n s
' [1 * ' ■ '; >■ < *> r": i- ■ . f 1; i O * ■ ■>•*?:' — • > v 1 s t i nr  1 r u l c 3 t O*'-') 3 " i .  *
w i l l  4 f '"1 i VI f\ rr. r \ 1 / v t h e s o r u l e s  3 f a r  ns t r e v  a r e
r  o m p r u h t - ! : ,  ** J 1 e i o :) e r a l s o  qu e s t  i n ns j u r i e s 1 a p t i t u d e .
he c i t e s  t h e  g r o w t h  o f  t h e j u r y  sy tem os t h e  c a u s e  f o r  t h e
increasing1 v s t r i c t  evidentiary rules."0 These rules, according
wO u ; cisst’F t beep important evidence from ho i nr presented at trial*
q?
The effect in t o  "block Iho road to a Vetter finding of facts,»
The reason for tnese rules has been the "growing realization that 
jurors are highly incapable of separating important information 
relating to the issue at hand from meaningless data# Jurors 
have been found unable to give proper perspective to what is tolA 
them; therefore, major data is kept from them deliberately. These 
restrictive rules grew in proportion to the power independence of 
juries in an effort to keep their attention focused on the matters 
at hand."
One reason juries may be inept at focusing on the facts of the 
trial, may be their'difficulty in understanding the complex legal
®^Gleisser, Marcus, op, cit. 39, p. 116.
S5
Frank, Jerome, op. cit, 62, p# 249. 
Gleisser, Marcus, op. cit, 39, p. 1 1 1 ,
87jd.
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language which are used in the judge's instructions to the
j u r i e s . Legal language, according to  Howard James, co n s is ts
of "f.am i ] i a r  words which have strange m eanings. . . . L a t i n ,  Old
!vng] ish , Middle ong U r ’h, and French words are common, and
1 awyers lisr wordo th a t  are extreme! v prec ise in one sentc-n’' h
arid woivis w ith  bre a ; n e a r, 1 n a 3 9  ^ j k * i h- a ':at*
r :--nt  ^ •: »• * *.•> ,« » . y ■*
:3lrnn- ji ' 1 £» C!  ^Y* * ( ► ■ot allowed to tnk e notes ,  they must net -m!y
try  to ijr.d- 03tried the jud ge 's  i n s t r u c t io n s ,  hut 11 ■ remember
them. hwario l :  i v f some inn':'r tarot 3 t i p u l a t  ion for  such words
as ” re t:romab I o a.anse" niov if- >r isof,o •
Th:, • • . . * ty-:t mane * i- 'nlv <nhn 1 ' ■ * 1 ! ! : ■ V i anal 3 or*' ♦ x-:‘ 1 n ie<
: m\: pnrors, snn
tund and i rtai eh.- .
f .lur
* y i ; -5 - ' 'jr^ TS 7 t' >’ 0 •' r,i the
'■;' c i nn ^? t.hev 1'i < • h ed uca t i anal back 
f ••••rfr C o le ,  "The me th od
nor i. o
■loot 1 ■ - 0 l 1 • 1 a too V ar i n n
'Ltd c-:rta 1.r 0baranto r ;aties
, such as • . r> t f\v*‘ 1 '*■ f a w v e r s t
ea, oi nor their pro-'oca u<na
4 V . ; r-
V ■ s ^  i c on neoti on wi th the
f n ,;J W 1 !,u t n s 0 cotrnlet.ie 1 1st
n < >; ] e o m ,i n
i ,  ” l“"(The above by
no means c
g o r ie s  which are ex luded from .jury d a tv  * In  Los Angeles, fo r  
example, the 1 i s t  in c lu d es :  t o l l g a t e  keepers,  people who work
on b o a ts ,  j a i l  and pr ison  workers ,  r a i l r o a d  eng in eers ,  and
89
90
James, Howard, op. c i t .  51, p* 265.
Cole, George F., Criminal Justice: 
Scltuate, Mass.: Dujtfury We'as,
Co., Inc., Belmont, CA), p. 276.
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o t h e r  workers, t e l e p h o n e  and telegraph employees, (the 
t e l e p h o n e  company w a i v e s  i t s  e x e m p t i o n ) ,  p o l i c e m e n  and f i r e ­
men,  members o f  t h e  N a t i o n a l  Ouard, t h o s e  s e r v i n '  In Ch­
armed s e r v i c e s ,  l e g i s l a t o r s ,  e l e c t e d  1 oea - , , r l u i v " s  uni
- *■ V-./ V/ o r  y ov e r i.rt r i a l  (?mpl o y e - ' s ,  t e a c h e r s , r::* i e t o r s , d r u y g i s t
h o s p i t a l  of f i c i a l s . phy s i c i a u s ,  s-. ion :1c 1 once p r i c 1 1 1,in
and r e a d e r s , monks, V.,,o 1 n o s n m c n f r  • >m nn e —nran bus I n c s o o s ,  in
anyone who h a s  s e r v e d  re; a J ur y  w i t h i n  t h e  y e a r . )  Howard 
J a mes  w r i t e s ,  11A large s e g m e n t  of h e t: tor-educated are u s u a l l y  
e x c l u d e d  f o r  one re  a s  or nr a n o t h e r .  I r many i n s t a n c e s ,  l a w y e r s ,  
when s e l e c t i n r :  a jure, wit1! r e f u s e  to  a c c e p t  b u s i n e s s  execu- 
t I v e s  r  r o t h e r s  ho': d lug r e s p o n s i b l e  p o s i t i o n s .  And t h e y  
r e  l o o t  j u r o r s  f o r  o t h e r  r e a s o n s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  a l w a y s  e x p l a i n e d
i n  a way t h a t  makes c i t i z e n s  feel that the system must be wrong.
Wi n  addition t o  the exclusion of many occupations, especially
the highly educated, there is a general reluctance among many
citizens to serve as jurors. This is partially due to the
low compensation received by jurors. The National Average
92
ranges between S4.00 to $15*00 a day. Also, jurors who are
called often do not end up sitting for a single case. Yet,
even when a juror does serve, most of their time is wasted,
Hans Zeisel writes that bench trials take 40 percent less
93
ttime than jury ttialef Howard James found that in Philadelphia
91James, Howard, op. cit. 5 1 , p 199.
7CId.
95itiia l, Han*, excerpt from Jaoee, Howard, crisis in th§ Q<£urtif
p. 193.
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and a number of ether cities,”It can take days and weeks to 
select a jury, This is especially true in a criminal case 
where headlines have 1 een running for several days, or when 
the prosecution interms to ask for the capita1 penalty and 
prospective jurors who oppose capital punishment are excused,”^  
because of this# jurors often become apathetic and antagonistic. 
The overall result, according to the Institute of Judicial 
Administration in :.ew York City, is that "Many qualified citi­
zens deliberately ovoid such service, leaving the work to
housewives, elderlv persons, etc,, so that a fair cross-section
95
of the community is not achieved
Rita Timon'o studies of juror competence and status suggest 
that the composition of the jury can have a pronounce! effect 
on both juror participation and juror understanding of the trial 
testimony and court instructions, dhe found that highly 
educated jurors contribute more comments based on court 
instructions and*procedure*than the less educated. The grade 
school educated jurors, on the other hand, commented more on 
substantive categories concerned with testimony# and personal# 
daily life experiences,^She also found that the males and 
jurors with a college education participated the most# whereas 
females and those with less education participated the least. 
Interestingly# the quality of contributions did not
94ja»es* Howard# op* oit# 51t p, 198#
M W R M S 5 :  "•* I °r1'
♦A speech scored "procedural'1 when It '•.as concerned with the 
for* or movement rather than the subatsnee of the discussion.
o i a ? & £ s y a » » .
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differ significantly between the 
school and gro !e school educated 
the :\\i a 1 i iy r f c n t r M o t: i on o o f t
college educated and high 
furors, (When speak!rig o'*
" j ur o rs , r h w a  s re f e rri ng
to their pertinency of opinion and recall of testimony#)
However| the grade school ciuea^od jurors• interpretation 
of the court’s instructions was significantly less accurate 
than the more highly educated jurors* According to her data, 
too accuracy in interpreting the court instructions was only 
41 percent amoung the grade school educated, whereas th< high 
school educated had a 56 percent accuracy and the college 
educated had a 67 percent accuracy*
Because many jurors are from typically less educated 
occupations, this data indicates that the quality of deliberation 
is in fact negatively affected* As was shown above, the less educated 
juror, unable to understand court instructions, may deal 
with a case inappropriately after having made a determination 
of guilt or innocence*
Problems With Plea Bargaining 
Although plea bargaining is not the terrible evil many 
commentators would have us believe, there still remain some 
clear problems with its current practice which should be 
addressed. The organization of the public defender’s office 
into a Mzone defense*1 system is the first of these.
The term wzone defense” refers to the way in which 
cases are processed through the public defender’s office.
Instead of being assigned to a specific case which they handle 
from start to finish, public defenders are assigned to
34
cases at specific stages* Rossett ana Jressev explain:
One defender tries tc handle all initial 
appearances, another covers the court­
room, where all preliminary hearings are 
held, and still another handles arraign­
ments* nnce a case passes the arraignment 
stage, a presiding judge assigns it to 
a specific superior court judge, ostensibly 
for trial* Then the case becomes the 
responsibility of theqdefender in that 
particular courtroom*
Because of the "zone defense" system, the defendant’s 
experience with the court is disjointed and confusing.
A defendant does not develop a healthy lawyer-client relation­
ship; in fact, he may not even know the name of his or her 
lawyer* Kossett and Cressey write, "It is not unsusual for
an accused felon to have five or six different defense lawyers
97at one stage or another.,*." There is not enough time for 
the public defender to become familiar with each case, not 
to mention with the client* Jonathan ii* Casper writes, "Most 
of the men ^defendants he Interviewed who retained public
defenders^ spent very little time with their public defender.
*
In the court in which they eventually plead guilty, they 
typically reported spending on the order of five to ten 
minutes with their public defender* The conversations 
usually took place in the bull-pen of the courthouse or in 
the hallway.** 978
•9”Roaa*tt and Graaaay, op, oit. 25 p.120.
9 7Id. at fzi.
98Ca»per, Jonathan D., "Did You (Have a Lawyer Wh*n You Want 
to Court? Ho, I-Had a Public Defender!", Cola, O.orge f .'Ob . 
oit. 80, 283. i ^
i. -
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The "zone • f'0 Pj•]n *, 
in particular, because he 
to retain private counsel
ystem affect the indigent client 
or she will not have the resources 
# The anonymity and loneliness of
this system, is likely tv serve as one more examole to ind i-
gent defendants of how the "system just doe3 not care," 
Because there is no time to develop a trusting relationship 
with their attorney, they are likely to view him or her as 
just another adversary, rather than someone who is on their 
side, Casper writes, "They {[indigent defer.dantsjpereeived 
the behavior of law enforcement officials as being essentially
the same as the behavior of law violators: conning, mani­
pulating, lying, using power and resources rather than 
applying principles of justice, and lacking in concern for
the characteristics and needs of others. Thus, law violation
OQ
and law enforcement seemed to be morally indistinguishable,"
That indigent clients feel dissatisfied with the performance 
of their counsel, is evident by the number of recidivists who 
decide not to utilize the services of a public difsnesr.
Donald J, Newman found that more than naif of the recidivists 
who initially plead guilty did not request the aid of the 
public defender, whereas virtually every first offender, 
whether pleading guilty or not, did request his or her aid, 
Because of th:e tuihimil contact the defendant has with 
his or her public defender, it is doubtful that the defendant
®°Casper, Jonathan D . , op. cit 9R, p. 282.
100Newnan, Donald J,, "Plaading fuilty For Consideration! A. 
Study of Bargain Juaticj*# Journal of Criainal Law, Criminology 
folios Scitnoa (1956), 780-790. *
is always fully aware l his or her alternatives. Therefore, 
the d e f e n d a n t ’ s ’agreement” t c  plead guilty may be question­
able. o s s e t t  and Cressey find three major problems with a 
defendant’s agreement to plead guilty. l)There is vagueness 
about what "agree" or "consent” actually means, 2)There i s  
’structural coercion” which entices defendants to r>V .j 
bargain. .(’Structural coercion” refers to the inherent 
pressure defendants ftfer in taking the risk of g6ing to trial 
or agreeing to an unbargained guilty plea,) 5)There is a 
mi3conception which assumes lawyers and clients assigned t o
each other are free to dismiss one another if obey cannot
„ 101agree upon a proper course of action.
The vagueness of a defendant’s ’agreement” to plead guilty 
could be mitigated if the public defender developed a relation 
ship with the defendant* In this relationship the pros and 
cons ,of the defendant’s options could be explained. In this 
way, the ’agreement” to plead guilty would be more meaningful. 
Under tho ’zone defense” system, however, there is virtually 
no way for a relationship like this to be developed. Instead, 
the indigent defendant is shuffled from station to station, 
and from public defender to public defender, beingsspared only 
the most extreme illegal procedures, present, the question 
of what the defendant is actually "agreeing” to when he or 
she pleads guilty is not of much concern to the Supreme Court, 
In North Carolina vs. Alford, Judge White wrete, "An individual 10
101Roasstt, Arthur, and Creaaey, Ponald R.f op. oit. 25, 
pp« 140*146.
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ami f  inally to h i g h e r  se n te n c e s  f o r  the a n  ttedant. 1 1 J  The 
defense attorney, therefore, often sees himself or herself 
as caught in the middle. In response! he or she must perform 
some politicking in order to obtain cooperation from the 
prosecution. According to the responses Jonathan D, Caspar 
obtained from many defendants, defendants perceive the *10
^^fl.orth Carolina vs. Alford 400 U*E* 257 (1971)#
10^Heu»ann# Milton* opt cit. 4, P*&9.
in maintaining a good
7
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well you may get mors*” Thus, this process, along with the 
"gone defense” organization of the public defender*r  ffi c e ,  
serves as one more source of distrust and alienation for the 
defendant. Defendants feel an informal pressure to go ulong 
with whatever the public defender says, once again, **agreeing” 
out of fear of worse consequences,
Much of the defendants fear of "worse consequences” stems 
from the fact that he or she is rarelv made cognisant of the 
presentence report or any other facts the prosecution has about 
him or her*10** In addition, he or she is rarelv present while 
a plea bargain Is discussed. The Note "Restructuring the Plea 
Bargain” from the Yale Law Journal writes, "Pleas are often 10
10^Casper, Jonathan D,, op, cit, 98, p, 282.
^"Restructuring the Plea Bargain”, 82 Yale Law Journal 290 (1972),
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the product of brief and clandeati?,e consultations between 
the prosecution and defense counsel which may occur in the 
courthouse corridor or the prosecutor’s nffiee.”10^ With this 
lack of knowlege, it Is folly 10 equate a defendant’s "agree* 
ment” t.o a plea of guilty as 1QO percent villd,
Another problem affecting plea negotiations is the 
differential treatment accorded wealthy defendants. The first 
and most important difference is the wealthy defendants ability 
to choose his or her own private attorney. In ao doing, he 
or she avoids the potluck style of representation presented 
by the ’zone defense” system# Because the wealthy defendant 
has paid for the defense attorney’s services# he or she is 
likely to feel owed competent legal advise. Therefore, the 
wealthy defendant is unlikely to feel timiJ about dismissing 
his or her counsel if he or she is dissatisfied. In ddaling 
with only one defense attorney, the wofllthy def9nd8nt is slso more 
likely to develop a lawyer-client relationship in which he or 
she ia represented by a true advocate of hia or her bast 
interests.
Indigent defendants charged with civil offense are often 
..signed counsel from legal aid societies. In addition to 
being presented with a potluck style of representation, these 
defendants are further disadvantaged, because their attorneys 
•re often inexperienced. Ellery E. Cliff writes, •’While it 106
106||. at 298.
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is true that a legal aid organization my have one or two 
highly capable, experienced men at the top, the individuals 
destined to carry the brunt of the workload are the young 
attorneys who are just starting out and who will be affili- 
ated with the organization for only a short period of time*
A new attorney is hardly qualified to meet career men stuped 
in the art of criminal trial work, such as is found in some 
large cities."10^
Most indigent defendants charged with criminal offenses 
are also assigned counsel. Herbert Jacob found, "Some thirty 
one states depend entirely on assigning counsel to indigent 
defendants; four states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecti­
cut, and Florida) use a tax supported public defender* The 
remaining fifteen states use privately financed or tax 
supported public defenders in metropolitan areas and assigned 
counsel in rural a r e a s . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  the quality of 
this legal counsel is also not very high, Herbert Jacob' 
writes, "Many lawyers assigned to defend indigents are not 
well-qualified in criminal law. Those who are just out of law 
school know only what they have learned in class; they have 
no court experience. Many of these drawn from a list 6f 
all the lawyers in the county are office lawyers who do not 
even have the advantage of recent clasaroom exposure to
10^ Cliff, Ellery B., past public defender in I*os Angeles. 
Taken from Howard Jamefa Crisis in the Courts. on. cit* §1,
108— Jacob. Herbert. Justice in Americas Courts, l  
the Judicial Proosai: Tlolton* ToronxoT TifWS*
Ire., 1965) p .'56.
P. 129.
c10Q
criminal proceedings and law#11 According to Herbert, 
those assigned a public defender fair better because “whether 
publicly or privately supported, defender’s offices are 
staffed by professionals who are as specialized and skilled 
as the prosecutor’s staff. The office attracts men of 
greater ability than assigned counsel systems, for it provides
not only a regular livelihood, but also in some Instances a
110chance for advancement.”
Albert Alshuler argues that a clients’ limited resources 
provide incentive for a privately retained attorney to pressure 
his or her client into plea bargaining. He points out that 
there are two major ways for a private attorney to achieve 
financial success.112 One is to “develop over an extended 
period of time, a reputation as an outstanding trial lawyer.
In that way, one can attract as clients the occasional wealthy 
people who become enmeshed in the criminal law. If, however, 
one lacks the ability or the energy to succeed in this way or 
if one is in a greater hurry, there is a second path to 
personal wealth— handling a large volume of cases for less- 
than-spectacular fees. The way to handle a large volume of 
cases is, of course, not to try them, but to plead them.”11^
■ —...... "■ ....  ' ' j
109Jacoto, HarBgrt, op, .it, 108, p. 58. ,
11°M-
11^lrtiuler. Albert, "The Defense Attorney*. Role In Pie. 
Bargaining*’^  Yale Law Journal 1202 (May 1975, No, 6).
112ld. *t 1t82.
in trying as many cases as possible 
Steinberg and Paulsen write that aftorneys^Will even go as
far as to inform their clients that the fee they are paying
is not enough to ’pay for a trial”* For the unfortunate
client who finds he or she cannot pay the attorney’s fee,
the pressure to plead guilty is even greater. Alshuler
recalls a plea negotiation session that he observed in the
chambers of a Chicago trial judge. In  this negotiation the
defense attorney’s representation of his client consisted
of a single sentence which he quoted: ”I haven’t been paid
in this case, so I'm agreeable to whatever you want to do.”
He observed no sign of disgust or disturbance from either
the prosecutor, or trial judge after this,”open confession of
professional irresponsibility”.1
The prosecutor and trial judge above are not the 
only members of the bar to turn their cheek on the subtle 
techniques many defense attorneys use to pressure or even 
coerce clients to plead guilty. The Supreme Court itself 
rarely finds evidence of coercion strong enough. James 
Stamos writes, ’While there are numerous pressures which may 
strongly Influence the defendant, the required degree of 
coercion is seldom found to satisfy the Supreme Court to 
reverse.”*1®
”*Al.bul.r, Albert op. .it, 111, p. 1202, 
118. Af*tl H®** °®*®v **«*•*• Attjr, Ohioago, JL
5 $ ;  U J S S L & Z  m i  ’ • * • J
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In addition to having the resources to retain a competent
private attorney of his or her choice, the wealthy client also
has the advantage of having the resources to make bail* In so
doing, he or she can hold out for an agreement which is more
acceptable, while avoiding the unpleasant environment of prison.
Because the defendant is free, there is also more opportunity
to prepare evidence to be used as a ,roargaining lever” against
117
the prosecution* Because the wealthy defendant
is not in jail, the use of tactical delays will not hurt him
or her.
The use of delays is a favorite technique of defense
attorneys. By delaying the disposition of his or her client's case
as long as possible, "Tempers cool, memories fade, and the
prosecutionls witnesses become warn down by repeated court
1appearance* or disappear altogether." These change* serve 
to weaken the prosecution's case} therefore, he or she becomes 
more willing to grant greater concessions to the defendant.
Alshuler writes, "As conviction becomes more difficult, the 
concessions available in exchange for pleas of guilty almost 
invariably become greater." * Laura Bansfield and C. David 
Anderson conducted a study which verifies that delays can have 
great influence on the eventual outcome of a cae#J200f the cases
*MS«
417*.
118Alshul*r, Albert, op. cit, m ,  p. 1231.
119Alshul*r, Albert, "fhe Prosecutor's Role in Flea Bargaining," 
36 3. Chicago 1* Ren. 38-64, (1#68). *
S *
nfield, Laura and Anderson, C. David. ^Continuances in the 
County Q r l i W  Courts," 3* U. Chicago &  Rev. 287-290, <1967).
'■<4
m m 1 . - -
they studied, the conviction rate declined from 92 percent
in cases that were tried timely to 48 percent in cases that
121
were substantially delayed. According to Alshuler, private 
attorneys are usually more successful at obtaining continuances
He explains:
A private attorney with only a few cases in a 
certain courtroom can usually devise a plaus­
ible reason for delaying each one. In one 
case, for example, the defendant may be too 
ill to appear? in another, a lengthy psychia­
tric examination of the defendant may be 
necessary? and in still another, a scheduling 
conflict may require the attorney’s presence 
in a different courtroom on the day set for 
trial. By contrast, a public defender assigned 
full-time to a single courtroom can never assert 
a scheduling conflict as a reason for delay, and 
if he presents other, more elaborate reasons 
in too many of bis cases, his motives will 
become suspect.
Because the wealthy defendant is more likely to retain a- 
private attorney rather than a public defender, he or she 
is more likely to benefit from the private attorney’s
tactical Advantage in obtaining delays. As a result of 
this advtsetage the private attorney, ie, the wealthy 
defendant, ie more likely to be given reduced charges or 
even a dismisaal, Banfield and Anderson found that eonvie-
#
tioaa on reduced chargee, dismissals, and acquittals all 
inoreass with the passage of time.125
121H ,  ,t 280*
122
i V
f W l f ^ ? 2 3 2 v
op* t 0  * ° t o  t r u l  ■
12% a & i # i d # I^auen4d^erson, a* Bavid, op* eit# 120 at 287*
The above discussion of the likelihood of wealthy defen­
dants receiving reduced charges appears on the surface to 
contradict Peter F. NardullPs findings that plea negotiations 
are usually predictable* However, when speaking of criminal 
defendants who are wealthy, one is referring to a very small 
minority. Alshuler writes that one way to financial success 
in criminal law is to develop a reputation as an Houtstanding 
trial lawyer* In that way, one can attract the 1 occasional1 
wealthy people who become enmeshed in the criminal law." *
Reform
Although this thesis refutes the use of plea bargaining, 
it does not deny that there are areas In need of reform. In 
the last section of this paper, which addressed the problems 
associated with the present practice of plea bargaining, these 
areas were discussed.
The zone defense style of defense shiuld be changed, 
because of the alienation and confusion it causes defendants. 
Defendants should each have one attorney which they can 
identify as their own. Instead of being assigned counsel, 
the defendant could be given a list of available attorneys*
The list could include the attorneys9 qualifications, aid 
the types of cases he or she specialises in# from this list, 
ths .defendant could chooaa his or bar attorney. The attorney 
he or ahe picked would be hia or bar attornay throughout tha
12*Alahularf Albart, op# ©it# 111* p# 1182#
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entire proceeding. In this wayf the defendant could not 
only identify his or her attorney, but hopefully also develop 
a relationship of trust. If the defendant becomes displeased with 
his or attorney, he or she, like the wealthy defendant, should 
be able to retain different counsel. To further reduce 
defendants* confusion, an informational sheet"should be 
given to them shortly after arrest which will describe the 
procedures they will be involved with. If the defendant is 
illiterate, the sheet should be read to him or her, lor defen­
dants speaking different languages, forms should be available 
in their native tongue.
In order to further mitigate defendants* confusion and
distrust, I agree with Eossett and Cressey, that the defendant
should be able to participate in any committee meetings between
125
the prosecution, public defenders and judges. In partici­
pating, he or she should be a genuine, vocal member of the 
committee. Complex terms and language should be avoided, and 
an effort should be made throughout the meeting to make sure 
the defendant understands what is going on. The defendant 
should also be given access, along with his or her attorney, 
to the presentenoe^report and any other facts ths prosecution 
has. In order to insure the availability of the prcsenteaee
report, there should be a re^uiretet* that it be completed 
hcfe^N^” ' ttajpjp^t Ration*
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmrnmmmmmmmmmmHmmm
l25Bo„,tt, Arthur and croMdy, Donnld R . , o p *  olt. 25, p. 174,
12T6ru»tg, woownd, thi, proe<*lurt in Kranti, *Bv«ln«t$nn of 
tfc, King*« County Pl«« Rtgotintion Confnmno* Progr„, 197f., 
(lfapulftinh+d Minuwri.pt propttwd for CJCC, Bontui tfnivnnity
*• vts'"-. — ' 4‘ "if' '  ^ A ■ * ■ • 'HL. , 4^  *'”r - ->*£'
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By enforcing the above procedures, the defendant 
understands the proceedings and his or her situation better 
Therefore, his or her "agreement" to plea bargain will be 
more meaningful.
48
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